Monetary Policy in the Large Open Economy by Michael R. Darby
NBER WORKING PAPERSERIES







The research reported here is *rt of the NBER's research program
in International Studies and project in Productivity in the World
Econonr. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1127
May1983
Monetary Policy in the Large Open Economy
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses recent evidence on the imperfect international
substitutability of goods and assets and the implications for conduct of
monetary policy in a majorindustrial country. A simple model is developed
foranalysis of the simultaneous determination of money growth and the
balance of payments under pegged exchange rates. Parallels are drawn to
the importance of expected depreciation in determination of floating
exchange rates. An assessment is made of the extent to which a central
bank can simultaneously pursue both exchange rate and money supply goals
through sterilized intervention. The paper concludes with the role of
saving rate differences in determining nonzero equilibrium trade balances.
Michael R. Darby
Department of Economics
University of California, Los Angeles
LosAngeles, California 90024
(213) 825—33431
For the Bank of Japan's Centenary
Conference on "Monetary Policy in Our
Time," Tokyo, Japan, June 22—24, 1983
D.3: April 16, 1983
MONETARY POLICY IN THELARGEOPENECONOMY
Michael R. Darby*
University of California, Los Angeles
National Bureau of Economic Research
Economists are fond of downward sloping demand curves and upward sloping
supply curves except when describing a nation's international economic
relations. In that case these curves are generally assumed to be either
horizontal or vertical as required to describe a perfectly open or perfectly
closed economy. The reason for this exceptional behavior on the part of
economists is easy to see: Simple models can be used in either extreme case,
but the analysis becomes rather complex in the intermediate case in which
economies are open but far from perfectly so.' This paper will first report
on recent empirical research that rather conclusively rejects either extreme
model for the major (noncommunist) industrial nations. The implications of
imperfect openness for their central banks' monetary policies will then be
*The author acknowledges helpful comments from SebastianEdwards, Maxwell
Fry, James Lothian, Maurice Obstfeld, and members of the UCLA Workshop in
Monetary Economics. The research reported here was supported partially by the
National Science Foundation and is part of the NBER's researchprogram in
International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
'Microeconomists are accustomed to choosing either thecompetitive or
monopolistic model according to the problem at hand; they thus generally avoid
the numbing complexity and inconclusiveness of the various oligopolistic
models. Unfortunately, such a choice between the extren macroeconomic models
would preclude —asI attempt to demonstrate below —seriousanalysis of
monetary policy in the major industrial countries. Fortunately, the
complexity of the intermediate model appears less severe than in the case of
oligopoly.2
analyzed. Finally the role of capital flows in determining the long—run
equilibrium values of the balance of trade and real exchange rate Is
discussed.3
I. Goods and Assets as Imperfect Substitutes Internationally
Either or both of two major assumptions have been used to characterize
perfectly open economies: goods are perfect substitutes internationally or
securities are perfect substitutes internationally. This section reports on
recent empirical work which decisively rejects both hypotheses. Most of the
work summarized here was done as part of the NBER's International Transmission
Project and will be reported by my collaborators and self in Darby, Lothian,
Gandolfi, Schwartz, and Stockman (1983).
Goods Substitution
The "global monetarists" like Laffer (1975) argued that internationally
traded goods are, for all practical purposes, perfect substitutes across
borders with prices rigidly linked by arbitrage.2 Factor competition between
tradable and nontradable goods was used to extend this arbitrage relation to
the "law of one price level" which held that purchasing power parity
continuously attains —notjust in the long—run as in the Huuiean
tradition.3 Previous empirical research, such as Isard (1977), Kravis and
Lipsey (1977, 1978),. and Richardson (1978), has concluded that goods are
substitutable internationally, but far from perfectly so.
2The term in quotation marks was introduced in Whitman's (1975) survey
article. In the relevant sense, price arbitrage requires that domestic prices
be strictly proportional (not necessarily equal) to the exchange rate
converted foreign prices. This implicitly assumes proportional shipping costs
and tariffs and that each good is always shipped in the same direction.
3Fausten (1979) persuasively distinguished the Humean tradition from the
law of one price level.4
The International Transmission Project results support that conclusion.
In a medium—scale simultaneous equation model of Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States
estimated for 1957—1976, the relative—price effects on the balance of trade
implicit in export and import equations are small in the initial quarter
although they do increase over time.4 In bivariate Granger causality tests
between domestic and foreign inflation for the same eight countries, lagged
foreign inflation was generally insignificant. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that price changes led money changes in nonreserve countries under
pegged exchange rates as suggested by analyses based on the law of one price
level.5 Only weak and far from universal foreign—price effectswere found in
reduced—form price equations estimated for the same eight countries.6 Thus
our results confirm the previous conclusion: Goods are imperfect substitutes
internationally.
Asset Substitution
The central bank's monetary policy may affect substantially and
immediately the balance of payments through asset flows even if the balance of
trade initially responds only weakly. Indeed in view of the previous
empirical rejection of perfect good substitution, perfect asset Bubstitution
4Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapters 5 and 6 by Darby and Stockmart).
5Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapter 4 by Cassese and Lothian). The
tests were run for periods ending 1971, 1973, and 1976.
6Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapter 14 by Gandolfi and Lothian).5
has become the usual defining characteristic of a perfectly open economy.7 In
this context, perfect asset substitution means that the domestic interest rate
is equal to the foreign interest rate minus the expected appreciation (per
annum) of the domestic currency over the term to maturity of the securities.
In contrast, imperfect asset substitutability implies that there is a risk
premium between the two interest rates which varies with the relative stocks
of domestic and foreign assets and which hence responds to international
capital flows. Thus, lower domestic interest rates could induce finite
capital outflows which raise the risk premium on foreign assets enough that no
further flows are induced by the yields on domestic securities which are lower
than the expected yields on foreign securities.8
The International Transmission Project approached this question in a
number of ways. Cassese and Lothian found that lagged as well as current
American interest rates had significant effects on the other seven countries'
interest rates during the pegged period; indeed generally the lagged effects
were more important quantitatively in contradiction to perfect short—run asset
substitution.9 In the structural model the estimated interest—rate effectson
capital flows were small; simulations confirmed that monetary policy changes
7Asset substitution is used here to refer to various national interest—
bearing securities; there is little if any evidence for the large industrial
nations of direct substitution in demand of the national moneys ("currency
substitution"). See also Cuddington (1983).
8lmperfect asset substitution results in the portfolio—balance models
pioneered by Branson (1968, 1970) and discussed at length below.
9Darby, Lothian, et al (1983, Chapter 4 by Cassese and Lothian).6
did not induce very large short—run balanceof payments effects underpegged
exchange rates.'°
An indirect approach providedstrong evidence against perfect asset
substitution for the seven nonreserve countries
under pegged exchange rates.
As demonstrated in Section II below, thiscondition is sufficient to render
their domestic monetary policy impotentunder pegged exchange rates. Itwas
shown that domestic policy goals were in factsignificant determinants of
these countries' money supply growth.11Daniel Laskar estimated the fraction
of a shift in the money supply reactionfunction which would be reflected in
the domestic money supply given the inducedcapital flows and the
sterilization behavior of the central bank. Forall seven nonreserve
countries under pegged exchange rates this fractionsignificantly exceeded 0
but did not significantly differ from i.12Thus the actual exercise of short—
run monetary control during the Bretton Woodsera is inconsistent with the
usefulness of the perfect asset substitutionhypothesis.
Moreover, the International Transmission Project'sstrong results are
consistent with the best recent empirical workreported in the literature.
Geweke and Feige (1979), Hansen and Hodrick(1980, 1982), Bilson (1981), and
Cumby and Obstfeld (1981, 1983), for example, allreject the hypothesis that
the forward exchange rate is an unbiasedpredictor of the future spot rate as
'°Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983,Chapters 5 and 6 by Darby and Stockman,
Chapter 7 by Darby).
"Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983,Chapter 10 by Darby).
12Darby, Lothian, et al. (Chapter11 by Laskar).7
it would be under perfect asset substitution.'3 Dooley and Isard (1979) and
Frankel (1982) have in contrast reported an inability to relate risk premiums
to outstanding bond supplies, but these results may well be explained by the
rather low power of their tests.'4 Furthermore, these tests all examine the
floating period in which assets should be relatively better substitutes than
under pegged rates when capital controls —andthe risk of their imposition
—weremore significant factors and international financial markets were less
well developed. The new evidence in Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983) appears
virtually to eliminate perfect asset substitution as a viable hypothesis.
'3Covered interest arbitrage imposes the condition that the domestic and
foreign interest rates will differ only by the discount or premium implicit in
the forward rate. Under imperfect asset substitution, the forward rate will
differ from the expected future spot rate by a risk premium that varies as
capital flows change outstanding holdings of bonds. This risk premium is
normally related to the role of exchange rate risk in the modern theory of
finance (Solnik 1973), but Dooley and Isard (1980) argue that political risk
of capital controls varies with the stock of outstanding debt. This factor
may well be the ire important.
'4Michael Melvin in Chapter 13 of Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983) was
rather more successful in applying Solnik's (1973) international asset pricing
model to explaining international capital flows.8
II. Independent Monetary Policy under Pegged Exchange Rates
The fact that for large industrial countries such as Japan or Germany
neither goods nor assets are perfect substitutes internationally implies that
changes in the central bank's reserves will permit it —withinlimits
discussed below —topursue simultaneously monetary and exchange—rate
goals. Indeed, even under pegged exchange rates independent monetary policy
is, to an extent, feasible in the short run. Although the floating—rate
regime is of most interest currently, it is helpful to first consider the
simpler case of pegged exchange rates.'5
In Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapter 10), I propose a simple
graphical device for analyzing the simultaneous determination of the balance
of payments and nominal money supply in a large, imperfectly openeconomy
maintaining a pegged exchange rate. The model combines the central bank's
reaction function with the semi—reduced form equation describing the economic
environment within which the bank operates.
The central bank's reaction function provides a formal statement of the
behavior of the monetary authorities working through the banking system. It
may be written compactly as
B
(1) logM=a+X+u
'5it could well be argued that a number ofmajorEuropeannations are de
facto pursuing pegged exchange rates with the German mark which in turn floats
relative to the U.S. dollar, the yen, and other major currencies. The ndel
would apply directly to these countries.9
whereM is the nominal money supply, B/H is the current period balance of
payments surplus divided (or scaled) by nominal base (high—powered) money, X
is a vector of all other variables which systematically affect the central
bank's behavior, and u is a random disturbance. Note particularly that lagged
values of B/H or scaled reserves may appear in X. Here we are concerned with
monetary independence within the short period, but the short—period curves may
well shift in the next period in response to what happens this period. The
parameter cx measures the extent to which the central bank sterilizes reserve
flows within the period: If a is 1, there is no sterilization while if a is 0
sterilization is complete.16 In other words, a represents the fraction of
the current balance of payments which the central bank allows to be reflected
in base money. 17
Although a complete structural model of the economy will not be produced
here,18 it is useful to define parity money growth (logM) as that change
16lndependent estimates reported in Chapters 6 and 11 of Darby, Lothian,
et al. (1983)placesa between 0 and 0.2 or 0.3 for all seven nonreserve
countries; only for Germany and perhaps Japan and the Netherlands
does a significantly exceed 0 for quarterly observations. Generally lagged
adjustments are found to be substantial, however. Examples of other authors
whoreportevidence of substantial short—run sterilization are Herring and
Marston (1977), Hilliard (1979), Connolly and Taylor (1979), and Obstfeld
(1980, 1982b). Laney and Willett (1982) present a tabular survey of estimated
sterilization coefficients reported through 1980.
7Some authors prefer to cast the central bank's reaction function in
terms of the scaled change in domestic credit:
(a1) + + u
However, in the presence of even partial sterilization (a<l) domestic credit
has no substantive role in either theoretical or empirical analysis and is
accordingly dropped. Its computation is straightforward for the interested
reader. Note that if a =1,scaled growth in domestic credit is X ÷u.
18See, however, Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapters 5 and 6) for
Stockman's and my attempt to do so.10
consistent with substituting in the money demand equation theexchange—rate
converted foreign price level and foreign interest rate:19
(2) (t1og M) =Z6+ c
Money growth faster than (ilog M) will be associated with domestic interest
rates lower and prices higher than their international parity values. Lower
interest rates will induce capital outflows while higher prices will reduce
the trade balance; thus money growth in excess of (Alog H) will reduce the
balance of payments surplus. Formally, we can write the semi—reduced form for
the scaled balance of payments as
(3)
where S is a vector of all other factors affecting the balance ofpayments
such as those contained in the trade supply and demand equations.
Specification of S is not of concern for the current analysis. Our primary
concern is the function e which determines the derivative of the scaled
balance of payments with respect to money supply growth.
19A minor complication arises if thenominal money supply has a
contemporaneous effect on real income. A considerable complication of the
analysis arises if we consider the following (second—order) effect which
arises when assets are imperfect substitutes: In that case a change in
central bank reserve holdings moves the equilibrium domestic interest rate
relative to the foreign interest rate. Then monetary policy could affect the
money stock and output without affecting prices. This point, which is due to
Maurice Obstfeld, suggests a way in which monetary policy would not be
entirely impotent (given imperfect asset substitution) even if goods were
perfect substitues. I assume here that the money demand effects of the
balance of payments through both the interest rate and output channels are
negligible in the short period being analyzed.11
The scaled balance of payments is, by the accounting identities, the
difference between the scaled trade balance CT/H) and the scaled net private
capital outflows (C/H):2°
B_T C HH H
Scaled net private capital outflows will be a function of the current covered
interest differential (adjusted for expected exchange rate changes) and other
variables which may be taken as given for the current period:21
(5) =f(R_p_RF)
where p is the expected depreciation of the exchange rate (p < 0 implies an
expected appreciation), R is the given foreign interest rate, and so ft is
negative. We find e'bydifferentiating equation (4):
20The variable C/H is here defined as minus the net cash flow from
international investment ——thatis, as net foreign investment less net
securities income. However, we neglect within the short period the second
order effect oflower domestic interest rates increasing net securities income
and hence lowering C/H; portfolio adjustments are assumed to overwhelm this
effect.
21Among these other variables is, of course, the lagged covered interest
differential since changes in the differential will cause portfolio revisions
and hence net capital flows. These other variables are predetermined within
the period and so Implicit in the function f( ).Asdiscussed in footnote 19,
the balance of payments will have a direct effect on the partiy value of the
domestic interest rate under imperfect asset substitution so that we might
prefer C/H =f(R+y[B/H]—p—R).However,this nrely requires substitution of
E(dp/d(B/H)) —yl fordp/d(B/H) in equation (7). Since either term is
definitely negative, none of the qualitative results are affected whether we
think of the balance—of—payments effect on domestic interest rates as
reflecting only an expected depreciation factor or also a portfolio—balance
factor.12
(6) e'd (B/H) d CT/H)— dR+ t dpd (B/H) -
d1,log M d L.log M d tlog M d (B7 d Llog N
(7) = 1 (d CT/H) — dR
— dp d log M d E,1og M
d (B/H)
The multiplier 11(1 —'
d(-9y)statesthat if the expected depreciationp
responds to the size of the balance of payments (as an indicator of the
probability and size of a revaluation), then the direct trade and capital flow
effects will be reinforced by induced "speculative" capital flows.22 These




Thus expected depreciation, which plays such an important role in recent
analyses of floating exchange rates, is potentially important under pegged
exchange rates also.
Solving equation (3) for money growth yields
(9) Llog M =4(. — SX)+ Z + c
whereis the inverse of the function •23 That is, increases in the balance
22Given the (predetermined) lagged value ofscaled reserves, B/H tells us
the value of current scaled reserves which Bilson (1979) and Harberger and
Edwards (1982) argue is an important indicator of the probability of
devaluation. Bilson also proposes a monetary indicator which can be
interpreted as the integral of log N —Zô— this is subsumed in the total
derivative dp/d(B/H).
231f goods are perfect substitutesinternationally (and
[d log P/d(log H)] > 0) or if assets are (and Ed log R/d(Alog M)J < 0)or
both, then e would reduce to a constant coefficient —sothatwould be the
constant 0 and 1og MZ5 +ewhich is the standard "monetary approach"
result.13
of payments relative to its parity value SX are associated with decreases in
morley growth relative to its parity value. Figure 1 plots equations (1) and
(9) on the same graph to illustrate the simultaneous determination of
equilibrium money growth (t,log )e and the balance of payments (/H)eq• The
equation (1) line would be vertical if the central bank completely sterilized
the contemporaneous balance of payments; its positive slope here indicates
partial sterilization is practiced. The (9) line would be vertical If
condition (8) was not met or under perfect international substitutability of
goods or assets;24 the line is drawn here as negatively sloping in the
relevant region.25 Unless the two lines happened to coincide, there would be
no equilibrium if both lines were vertical. The intersection of the (1) and
(9) lines gives the short—period equilibrium values of the scaled balance of
payments and money growth.26
Suppose that economic conditions characterized by X1 include higher
domestic unemployment than those in X0 and that this increases the money
growth desired by the central bank for any given value of the balance of
payments (X1 > X0). As illustrated in Figure 2, this shift in domestic
policy goals induces an increase in money growth and decrease in the balance
of payments. The more open is the economy, the steeper will be the downward
sloping line which represents the central bank's payments—balance/money—growth
tradeoff, and the greater will be the balance of payments effect and the
24See note 23 above.
25The multiplier of equation (7) is positive with condition (8) holding
while —<[d(T/H)/d(log N)] < 0 and > [f'dR/d(ilog M)] > 0 under
imperfect substitution. Therefore -<8' < 0 which implies —<4' < 0.
261f this also corresponds to a long—period equilibrium, it should be
along a line from the origin with slope less than 1. In that case money
growth derives from growth in both reserves and domestic credit.14
FIGURE 1
Simultaneous Determination of Balance of Payments and Nominal Money
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lesser the money growth effect of any given shift in the centralbank's
reaction function. 27
The graphical analysis did not take account of thepossibility that both
the probability and the size of a devaluationmay increase with the absolute
value of B/H or its deviation from its parity value SX.If this is so
dp/d(B/H) will approach the critical value 1/f' for large absolute values of
B/H and therefore the tradeoff will worsen as in Figure 3•28 This
possibility, as well as the implied effects on future tradeoffs, would limit
the range within which the central bank would choose tooperate. The size of
this range remains unknown, but the evidence in Darby,Lothian, et al. (1983)
suggests that a ten percent deviation of the actual from the parity level of
nominal money is near the limit of monetary independence forlarge open
economies which maintain a pegged exchange rate. Furthermore, this deviation
cannot be maintained Indefinitely because of the cumulative effecton reserves
of continuing large balance—of—payments deficits or surpluses.Ultimately
either monetary policy or the exchange—ratepeg must be adjusted.
27However, in choosing a andpthecentral bank is aware of the
(expected) tradeoff which it faces, so generally alternatively shaped
tradeoffs would induce alternative reaction functions. Lucas's (1976)
critique implies that the shape of the tradeoff surface may also dependupon
the central bank's choice of a and p.Furthermore,a government pursuing a
nationalistic monetary policy may offset the balance—of—payments effects of
the policy by changes in, say, commercial policy which affect SXso as to
shift the (9) line upwards.
28Thjs analysis providesa rather simpler explanation of when balance—of—
payments crises occur than that suggested by Krugman (1979). As the central
bank moves money growth further from the parity value, thestability condition
(8) is finally violated and speculative capital flows becomeoverwhelming. In
the medium scale model reported in Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983),dp/d(B/H)
does increase In absolute value with t(B/H)I, but the stability condition
appears to hold except at the time of actual balance—of—payments crises.17
FIGURE 3
Simultaneous Determination of Balance of Payments and Money Where
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III. Monetary Policy, Floating Exchange Rates, and the Trade Balance
The theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects ofmonetary policy
under floating exchange rates has not progressed to the point thatneat
summary diagrams can be produced to illustrate major results. Indeed we seem
to know disappointingly little despite the expenditure of much talent and
effort. If this section seems maddeningly tentative to the policyinaker, it
must be recalled that false knowledge is far more dangerous than anawareness
of ignorance.
Broadly speaking, economists' prior expectations of the results of
widespread floating among major currencies have been confirmed in two major
respects, but economists have been surprised in one important aspect.
Generally economists were correct in their expectations of long—run neutrality
and enhanced monetary independence but erred in predictions thatexchange
rates would gradually move in reflection of relative inflation rates.
The long—run neutrality of the economy with respect tomonetary policy is
perhaps our most secure result: That is, an increase in the level ofmoney
will ——inthe long run and with other things equal ——bereflected in an
equal increase in prices and the nominal exchange rate with no effect on real
output or the real exchange rate.29 Superneutrality is rather less
secure:3° First, as inany closed economy, higher money growth and hence
29The nominal exchange rate is measuredas domestic currency units per
unit of foreign currency. The real exchange rate (also known as the
purchasing power ratio) is the nominal exchange rate times the ratio of the
foreign to the domestic price level.
30Superneutrality implies that the real variables in theeconomy (e.g.,
real output and the real exchange rate) are unaffected in long—runequilibrium
by changes in the trend growth rate of nominal money.19
inflation may shift the aggregate production function downward, increase the
investment—income ratio, and decrease labor input;31 real output, the real
interest rate, and the real exchange rate may be changed in either direction
depending upon the relative importance of the various effects and upon
parameters describing the economy. Furthermore, if increased money growth is
accomplished through increased purchases of foreign reserves this will tend to
depreciate the real exchange rate.32
My colleague James Lothian (1983) has recently made some calculations
which demonstrate both the strength of the neutrality results and the relative
unimportance of any deviations from superneutrality. In this work he analyzed
for various variables the differences between their average growth rates for
1956—1973 and 1974—1980. Having obtained data on these "growth shifts" for
twenty OECD countries, Lothian showed that the growth shift in prices matched
that in money while there was essentially no correlation between growth shifts
31The aggregate production function shifts are discussed in the
traditional literature on the costs of inflation. Tobin (1965) inItiated
consideration of possible capital deepening, and Friedman (1977) introduced
the possibility that higher unemployment is caused by higher inflation rates.
32The argument is that increasedgovernment flow demand for foreign
securities will increase equilibrium net exports which can only be
accomplished (under imperfect long—run goods substitutability) at a higher
real exchange rate. Recent discussions of central—bank demand for foreign
reserves under floating exchange rates include Hailer and Khan (1978) and von
Furstenberg (1982). However, Obstfeld's (1982a) results would imply here that
equilibrium net exports would not increase if individuals viewed the
government's holdings of foreign securities as equivalent to their own. A
full steady—state analysis requires consideration of the service—account
effects of the government purchases (which would ultimately reduce net
exports) discussed by Obstfeld (1981). Further, long—run price elasticities
may be much larger than the short—run elasticities so that long—run perfect
goods substitutability may be a close approximation to the truth.20
in output and money growth shifts. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate these striking
results.33 These results demonstrate that any shifts in levels of y and P due
to failure of superneutrality are negligible (when averaged over seven years)
in comparison to either random fluctuations in the growth rate of real output
or to the changes in the growth of prices induced by the growth shift in
money. Similarly, Lothian finds that the growth shifts in either relative
inflation or relative money growth have an effect on the growth shift in the
exchange rate which differs insignificantly from one. Having thus noted that
neutrality and even superneutrality hold to an acceptable degree of
approximation, we can concentrate on the independence of monetary policy and
the reasons why its exercise might have a short—run impact on real output and
the real exchange rate even in the absence of any long—run effects.
Although frequently reacting in the same way to international events,
those central banks which have not attempted to maintain pegs with other
currencies after the breakdown of the Bretton—Woods system have certainly
demonstrated their ability to pursue independent monetary policies.34 The
primary impact on real exchange rates of unexpected changes in monetary policy
has been associated with the liquidity (or real—interest—rate) effect of these
33The lines are drawn through the sample means with the theoretical
slopes (under neutrality and superneutrality) of 1 and 0, respectively.
Lothian's regression analysis indicates that we cannot reject at the 5%
significance level either that the coefficient of trM is 0 in a linear
regression explaining Ary or 1 in a similar regression for rP, where M' means
"the growth shift in" and where y, M, and P are real GNP (or GDP), narrow
money, and consumer prices, respectively. He also ran U.S. dollar exchange—
rate (E) equations of the forms tE a + b(rM—rM5),
a + b(til'M—trM5) + c(sry—try5), and M'E =a+ b(trP—FP); as reported
in the text, in each case b differed from 1 insignificantly at the 5% level.
34See, for example, Darby and Lothian (1983) for our analysis of British
monetary policy under Margaret Thatcher.21
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monetary shocks.35 The basic idea is a simple one: An unexpected change in
the interest rate at home relative to abroad will induce incipient capital
flows. If a positive money shock lowers the domestic interest rate, for
example, a capital outflow would be induced, all other things equal. In order
for this capital outflow to be stanched, the exchange rate must rise
sufficiently that anticipations of later decreases in this variable reduce or
eliminate the decrease in the interest rate differential adjusted for expected
depreciation. If assets were perfect substitutes internationally, the
adjustment in expected depreciation would have to exactly offset the change in
the interest rate. A smaller adjustment is required if assets are imperfectly
substitutable internationally and some change in capital flows actually occurs
because of either contemporaneous adjustment in the trade balance or changes
in central bank reserve purchases.
Suppose that increased money growth were perfectly anticipated so that
equal contemporaneous changes occurred in the actual and expected inflation
rate and growth rate of the nominal exchange rate. Then there would be no
n1tal jump n the exchange rate along the lines just suggested. Thus it is
seen that the movements in the nominal and real exchange rates associated with
35A vast listerature has blossomed from Dornbusch's seminal contribution
(1976), but see also Dornbusch (1980, 1982). Home (1983) reviews the
empirical research to date and concludes that 'the evidence of the 1970s
supports the portfolio balance model" which is presented here.unexpected changes in monetary policy are due to movements in the real
interest rate,36
This impact effect of monetary policy on the real (and nominal)exchange
rate might be quite large. For example, Goodhart and Temperton (1982)
attribute nearly all of the 30 percent fluctuation in the British real
exchange rate over 1979—1981 to monetary policy.37 This exchange—rate impact
adds a channel of influence for monetary policy not present underpegged
exchange rates: Unexpected decreases in money growth immediately reduce the
demand for traded goods and hence aggregate demand.38 The immediate effecton
the trade balance of these movements in the real exchange rate isestimated to
be close to nil.39 It is the lagged effects which apparently influence the
adjustment process.
When we move from consideration of the initial impact ofmonetary shocks
to the subsequent adjustment process, our empirical base becomes weak, but
some suggestive comments can be made. First, the initial movement of the real
361f assets were perfect substitutesinternationally, the home nominal
(real) interest rate would equal the foreign nominal (real) interest rateplus
the growth rate of the nominal (real) exchange rate. Thus a policy which
caused the domestic real interest rate to fall relative to the foreign real
interest rate by an average of 3% per annum for three years would inducean
immediate 9% real depreciation so that the real exhhange rate could be
expected to decrease (i.e., appreciate) by 3 percent per annum for the next
three years. Isard (1982) has in particular argued that the long—run value of
the real exchange rate is fixed by trade balance considerations (onwhich, see
Section V below) while Dooley and Isard (1981) extend theargument to apply
qualitatively in an imperfect—substitution or portfolio—balance model.
370i1 price movements (the prime alternativeexplanation) were found to
have had a negligible impact.
38Under pegged exchangerates, prices of traded and nontraded goods move
much more synchronously in the absence of a revaluation.
39That is, within the currentquarter the changes in the quantities of
exports and imports are approximately offset by the changes in their domestic—
currency prices.25
exchange rate is gradually eliminated over time, but whether this adjustment
is smooth or involves overshooting depends on the adjustment path of the real
interest rate. The trade balance increases over time in response to a
positive monetary shock, but then the price advantage of an increased
(depreciated) real exchange rate is eliminated over time. Note, however, that
the temporarily increased trade balance implies private (or government) net
accumulation of foreign securities in excess of what would otherwise be the
case. Once this accumulation becomes important, it implies a lower domestic
interest rate relative to the expected—depreciation—adjusted foreign interest
rate. Unfortunately the implications of this asset accumulation are far from
well understood, but apparently depend in part on whether they are ultimately
reversed for reasons discussed in Section V below.40
Sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market —acontinuing
central—bank exchange of foreign for domestic securities —canbe used to
moderate the required initialmovementin the real exchange rate. This would
be attractive, for example, if the otherwise disproportionate share of the
costsborn bythe traded goods sector would make an antlinflationary policy
politically unacceptable.41 The same factors whichpermit a degree of
independenceto monetary policy under pegged exchange rates permit the
simultaneous pursuit of monetary and exchange—rate goals under floating
exchange rates; in each case the reserve movements must be accepted as the
cost of the central bank's influence on the second variable. Again, the
effect of these flows on the expectation that the operations will be abandoned
40See, however, the pioneering effort by Henderson (1980).
41i am unaware of any attempt to compare the relative costs of sterilized
intervention withdirectsubsidies to traded—goods producers.and the exchange rate change which would ensue would limitthe central bank's
freedom to pursue the secondary goal.
In summary, floating the exchange rate eliminates theshort— andlong—run
limits on monetary growth, but also changes theimpact of monetary policy by
speeding and increasing the impact on the traded—goodssector. This
difference can be ameliorated by sterilized interventionto sot extent. But
ultimately choice of a pegged exchange rate is a decisionto restrict monetary
growth to a range —determinedby the reserve country ——withinwhich the
traded—goods sector can be protected by sterilized intervention.Abandonment
of that complete protection is the cost ofmonetary independence.27
IV.SomeRational—Expectations Considerations
Thus far we have been concerned with the feasible set from which the
central bank can select combinations of money growth, reserve flows, and
exchange rates and with the results of that choice. Expectations have been
left largely in the background except for the expected rate of depreciation.
But much recent macroeconomic research has demonstrated the importance of
expectations in determining the point of departure relative to which we have
been comparing the effects of unanticipated policy changes. This research
cautions us that the short—run impacts of the policies considered depend
crucially upon the unexpected nature of these policies. Therefore the short—
run impacts on the real economy would not exist if the central bank
systematically attempted to exploit, say, the beneficent effects of
accelerated money growth on the traded—goods sector under floating exchange
rate system.
Some economists working in the strict rational—expectations tradition
associated with Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent have gone beyond these well
known cautions against attempts to exploit effects associated with policy
innovations. In particular, they have attempted to analyze the variance of
output implied by simple nxdels under alternative exchange—rate/monetary—
policy regimes.42 These authors show that an optimal portfolio of foreign
disturbances may reduce the variance of output and thus stabilize the economy
relative to a policy regime which more effectively insultates the economy from
foreign disturbances. Some authors emphasize the private sector's adjustment
42See, for example, Saidi (1980), Weber (1981), Flood and Marion (1982),
Flood (1982), and Kimbrough (1983).28
in the output—inflation tradeoff as the regime changes while others emphasize
potential informational content of exchange rate movements.
The rational—expectations models remain very simple and cannotyet
provide any practical guidance to policymakers. They do raise the issue,
however, of whether the relevant questions concern the feasibility and effect
of a particular money growth under a particular exchange rate regime or the
stochastic structure of the economy which would result from alternative rules
for choosing monetary growth.29
V. Capital Flows, the Trade Balance, and the Real Exchange Rate
in Long-Run Equilibrium
The discussion so far has treated the trade balance as predetermined with
capital flows and depreciation—adjusted interest rates adjusting to maintain
equilibrium. The concept of an autonomous trade balance has little appeal
once we move beyond the initial short period. Indeed the long—run equilibrium
is better characterized by autonomous net capital outflows and passively
adjusting trade balance and real exchange rate.
This is seen most easily by noting that only one real exchange rate is
consistent with a given trade balance in long—run equilibrium.43 Therefore
expected real depreciation is inconsistent with long—run equilibrium, and
capital flows must be responding to actual differences in real interest
rates. Suppose Japan has a high saving—income ratio relative to the rest of
the world and the United States a relatively low one. If both economies
always maintained zero trade balances and capital flows, the real interest
rate would become low in capital—rich Japan and high in the U.S.44 Instead
capital outflows and trade surpluses for Japan and capital inflows and trade
deficits for the U.S. have achieved a more efficient world distribution of the
capital stock. However, these flows will not continue forever: As Japanese
431f goods are perfect substitutes internationally, aninfinity of trade
balances will be associated with the single equilibrium real exchange rate.
If goods are imperfect substitutes internationally even in the long run, then
higher (more depreciated) real exchange rates will be associated with higher
trade balances. In a growing economy, the trade balance is best measured as a
ratio to GNP.
44To the extent that Japan specializes in highly capital—intensivegoods
and the U.S. in less capital—intensive goods, this tendency is ameliorated.
An alternative, complementary basis for net capital inflows to the U.S. is the
political security of private investments there.30
wealth rises, its growth rate (saving/wealth) will fall until it converges to
the growth rate of output in the world economy.45 Eventually, assuming this
growth rate is less than the real return on capital, Japan's foreign
investment income will exceed its net foreign investments and the difference
will finance —indeedforce —atrade deficit. Throughout the adjustment
process and in very long—run equilibrium, the excess saving in Japan (or
saving shortage in the U.S.) determines the equilibrium net capital outflows
and hence the trade balance and real exchange rate. Commercial policy can
only alter the composition of the trade balance by affecting relative
delivered prices and hence apparent comparative advantage.46
If then we adopt the view that in the long run national capital stocks
and wealth will be unaffected by unexpected money growth, we must conclude as
suggested in Section III that the adjustment process to a monetary shock
cannot be characterized by smooth adjustment. The abnormal capital flows
induced by initial movements in the real exchange rate must ultimately be
undone by offsetting movements. We conclude that it will be some time before
a full understanding of the intermediate effects of monetary shocks is
achieved.47
45Japanese wealth was abnormally low in the early postwar period both
because of wartime devastation and because of the rapid growth in Japanese
human capital.
461t is curious that U.S. labor unions would focus on the "jobs lost" due
to the excess of imports over exports rather than the corresponding gain in
employment and real wages due to the capital inflows financed by the trade
deficit.
exploratory effort integrating trade and capital flows in a full
adjustment analysis is reported in Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapter 12 by
Dan Lee).31
VI. Conclusions
The Bretton Woods System afforded the major nonreserve central banks a
range for independent monetary policy which was neither negligible nor
unlimited. The banks' resistance to accelerating American inflation in the
late 1960s ultimately broke down and the resulting burst of inflation in the
early 1970s led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System.48 The ensuing
decade of generalized floating among major currencies (or currency blocs) has
presented some surprises and so engendered much theoretical and empirical
research.
The work to date suggests that the major source of instability in real
exchange rates has been instability In monetary policy. The Federal Reserve
System has long been infamous for accelerating money growth to reduce
unemployment and then causing a recession to control the resultant
inflation.49 The high inflation legacy of the Bretton Woods System has left
the other major central banks with a similar dilemma and unfortunately similar
results. One aspect of the exercise of independent monetary policy is the
major impact on the traded—goods sector which is both quicker and stronger
than that associated with the sorts of unexpected money growth which could
occur under the Bretton Woods System.
48A detailed discussion is provided by Darby and Lothian in Darby,
Lothian, et al. (1983, Chapter 17).
49Wlether this reflects a defect in the Federal Reserve Systemor in the
American political system is not addressed here.32
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